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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2a-3(2)G) (2002).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
L

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 provides in pertinent part:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the
party to be charged with the agreement:

(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
II.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) states:
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the
recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom he
is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other
compensation may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with
whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated.

III.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before
the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
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IV.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) provides in relevant part:
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
In 2002, a petition for the dissolution of Olympus Construction, L.C.

("Olympus"), was filed with the Third Judicial District Court. R. 1. Pursuant to a
stipulation of the members of Olympus, the district court appointed a receiver (the
"Receiver") to wrap up the affairs of Olympus. R. 586, 589. The Receiver subsequently
obtained from the court orders establishing a claims bar date and a claims filing
procedure. R. 843, 2085.
David C. Matthews ("Matthews") filed a claim with the Receiver alleging that—
based upon an alleged oral contract—he is entitled to a real estate commission from
Olympus in the amount of $100,000 (which is addition to the amount that was provided
for in the written real estate documents and that undisputedly was paid to him). R. 968.
On November 29, 2004, Matthews filed a Motion to Pay Claim with the district court
arguing that because the Receiver had not rejected his claim within ninety days of its
filing, his claim had to be "considered approved." R. 1044. The district court denied this
motion and held that Matthews's claim should be adjudicated in accordance with a claims
resolution procedure that was proposed by the Receiver and subsequently adopted by the
Court. R. 2145.
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In accordance with the court-approved claims resolution procedure, the Receiver
rejected Matthews's claim on April 14, 2005. R. 2147. The Receiver then filed a motion
seeking summary judgment on Matthews's claim on the basis that the claim is barred by
the statute of frauds and by Utah real estate statutes. R. 2647. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Receiver on December 20,2005. R. 3037. The
Receiver also sought an award of attorney fees from Matthews, R. 2986, and on June 12,
2006, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the
attorney fee issue. R. 3122. Then, on July 20, 2006, the district court entered its order
granting attorney fees to the Receiver. R. 3155. Matthews filed a notice of appeal on
August 9, 2006. R. 3320.
Statement of Facts
The Dissolution of Olympus
1.

On or about January 31, 2002, a Petition for Judicial Dissolution of
Olympus

Construction, L.C. ("Olympus") was filed with the district court. R. 1.
2.

On August 12, 2002, the members of Olympus entered into a Stipulation

for Decree of Judicial Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the
"Stipulation"). R. 586. The Stipulation was executed for the purpose of dissolving the
working relationship between the members of Olympus in an orderly manner. Id
3.

On August 20, 2002, based upon the Stipulation, the Court entered an

Order of Decree of Judicial Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the
"Order of Dissolution"). R. 589. Pursuant to the Order of Dissolution, the district court
3

appointed a receiver and granted the receiver "the normal and customary powers of a
receiver." Id On May 5, 2003, the court entered its Stipulated Order Approving
Successor Receiver ("Successor Receiver Order"), appointing Annette W. Jarvis as the
Successor Receiver.
Establishment of Claim Resolution Procedure
4.

The Successor Receiver Order provides, in relevant part:

2
. As Receiver, Ms. Jarvis shall wind up the business and
affairs of Olympus as provided in Part 13 of the Utah Limited Liability Company
Act, and shall exercise all of the powers of a receiver of a limited liability
company provided for by law or equity, except as her powers may be specifically
circumscribed or expanded by the terms of this Order or any subsequent order of
the Court.

4.
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may
dispose of known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or
publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject
claims all as provided in Utah Code Ann. Sections 48-2c-1305 and 1306. To the
extent permitted by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and
determined by this Court in and as part.of this proceeding. The Receiver may
petition the Court, and the Court may order, expedited procedures for the
adjudication and determination of claims, as may be appropriate and necessary for
the prompt determination of claims.

12. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Receiver from
requesting augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers as
Receiver to the full extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to
the Court and after notice and a hearing.
Id, at^[f2.
5.

!

(emphasis added).
Pursuant to her authority under the Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver

filed on December 2, 2003, a motion with the district court seeking to establish a claims
4

bar date and claims filing procedure. R. 791.
6.

No objections were filed to the motion, and on February 26, 2004, the

Receivership Court entered its Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief
and Establishing a Claim Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure (the "Bar Date Order").
R. 864.
7.

The Bar Date Order established June 30, 2004, as "the bar date for all

claims to be filed against Olympus' receivership estate," and further provided that "to the
extent creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever barred." Id. at ^ 3.
8.

The Bar Date Order also approved the form and manner of written notice to

be provided to known creditors, the form and manner of publication notice to be provided
to all creditors, and the procedures by which creditors were to file their notices of claim
against the Receivership Estate. However, the Bar Date Order did not address how
claims filed pursuant to the Bar Date Order were to be resolved. See id. atfflf3-6. The
Bar Date Order does not include any provision for the automatic allowance of claims.
Rather, the order states: "[T]he filing of a claim by a creditor against Olympus does not
necessarily mean that it will be allowed. The Receiver . . . reserves the right to file an
objection to all or a portion of any filed claim. Id. at f 4(D).
9.

On November 18, 2004, the Receiver filed a motion with the district court

for approval of claims resolutions procedures. R. 1021.
10.

Matthews responded to the Receiver's motion for the establishment of

claims procedures by filing a motion for approval of his claim in which he argued that his
claim was "considered approved" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(4). R. 1044.
5

He also formally and simultaneously opposed the approval of the claims resolution

On March 16, 2005, the court entered an order establishing a claims
resolution procedure. R. 2085 In addition

uM

the district court denied

M u t t l n M <»\' nil it ni i mi ni II n
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district court specifically indicated that Matthews's claim would be resolved "in
accordance with the Claim Resolution Procedure approved by the Court." i"1 I hus, the

Receiver was entitled to adjudicate all of the claims against Olympus—including
Matthews's claim—on the merits.
Adjudication of Matthews's Cku,;is
12.

On July 6, 2005, the Receiver filed a motion for summary judgment, asking

the district court to reject Matthews's claim on the grounds that it was barred by the
statute

-j

•13.

" • - ' < .-
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The court granted this motion on December 2u, 2005. R. 3037.
The Basis for an Award of Attorney Fees

14.

On I i me 1 2 2006 the disti let coi u I: entered its findings of fact and

conclusions of law with respect to the Receiver's motion for attorney fees. R. 3122. The
district court made the following factual findings:
A.

:

Mfitfhm s sij'iinl 111 • M Hllim \ « 1'in

claim in this receivership case on June 30, 2004.
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B.

Pursuant to the Matthews Claim, Matthews asserted that Olympus

owes him $100,000 for his services as a real estate broker in connection with
Olympus's purchase of real property in Summit County in 1998.
C.

The face of the "Notice of Claim" form on which Matthews asserted

his claim indicates that by signing and filing the claim, Matthews was swearing
and attesting "to the truthfulness and accuracy" of the claim under penalty of
perjury.
D.

The "Notice of Claim" form clearly identifies "David C. Matthews"

as the "Creditor," which the form defines as the "person or other entity to whom
Olympus owes money or property."
E.

Nothing on the face of the Matthews Claim or in any of the

documents Matthews submitted to the Receiver as attachments to the claim
indicates that the alleged $100,000 real estate commission was promised or owed
to any person or entity other than Matthews in his direct, individual capacity.
F.

After investigating the grounds for the Matthews Claim, the

Receiver determined that the claim was meritless.
G.

The Receiver sent a letter dated October 6, 2004 to Matthews'

counsel requesting that Matthews withdraw his claim and specifically notifying
Matthews that if he did not, the Receiver intended to "proceed with litigation in
the Receivership Court to obtain summary disallowance of the Matthews Claim"
and would seek "court costs and attorneys fees from Mr. Matthews to the extent
allowed by law."
7

H.

The Receiver incurred substantial attorney fees on behalf of

(but not limited to) attempting to convince Matthews to withdraw the claim
without litigation, successfully opposing Matthews' motion to compel immediate
payment nl lllm i II iiiiiiiiii II Hiiiiall, nppu,iing tlir t'Liiiii |mi.iiJiint In Ihr

iiiiill ip|ini i ul

claim resolution procedures in effect in this receivership case, and successfully
prosecuting a summary judgment motion and obtaining a ruling disallowing the
claim as a ma ttei of la v.
I.

On May 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Amended Claim Response

(the "Claim Response") addressing the Receiver's formal objection to the
IS latthe\* s Clain i.
J.

Nothing in the Claim Response indicated that Matthews was

claiming he was an assignee of a claim held by a real estate broker named Fred B.
I a \v
K.

Matthews contended that the documents submitted to the Receiver in

connection with the Matthews Claim "clearly establish the existence of a broker
relationship I: :;t \ s ,reeii I * !i I la;ttheA vs a lid 01} mpi is " Claim R esponse at 2 3
L.

Matthews asserted that Olympus "agreed to pay Mr. Matthews a

$100,000 commission" (Claim Response at 3), that the claimed $100,000

(Claim Response at 3), that Matthews "performed valuable services in conjunction
with the acquisition of the subject real property in reliance upon the agreement to
8

pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 in exchange for such services" (Claim Response at
7), that "the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 was made . . . as an
inducement for Mr. Matthews to provide services" (Claim Response at 8), and that
"Mr. Matthews did not have a cognizable action against Olympus until Olympus
breached its promise to pay Mr. Matthews the $100,000" (Claim Response at 9).
M.

Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute

of frauds by arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting
citations to the contrary, that the commission amount was not an essential contract
term and need not be in writing.
N.

Matthews argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a

limited exception under Utah case law that only applies when a defendant has
admitted, either in pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract exists.
O.

Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted

the existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn
statement.
P.

Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was

made in late 1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of
Olympus as evidence of the alleged promise, but he failed to do so.
Q.

Matthews admitted that his attempt to obtain a signed writing from

Richard Jaffa to evidence the alleged oral promise was unsuccessful.
R.

After the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission

statutes, Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by
9

arguing, contrary to his original position, that he was an assignee of a claim
1 j - i •.

own name.
S.

In Request 1 4o. 14 of the Receiver's Requests for Admission

your filing of the Matthews Claim and related papers in the receivership court is
an attempt b y you to obtain payment of the real estate commission from someone
o l l i n i t h a n .1 Imi m i i p . i l In I-1 ni "

T.

In Request N o . 16, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that

Re-Max Brokers, i .* . was the principal brokerage with which you were affiliated
CMiuji

1 19981 ki •< >ii lghDet member 1998 "
U.

In Interrogatory No. 4 of the Receiver's Interrogatories propounded

to Matthews pursuant to Utah R, Civ. P. 33, Matthews identified all principal
brokers 1 * ! 1th h Dm h 3 \ as a ffiliate d and ! latthew s stated, ini i
Matthews principal broker in 1998," but Matthews made no mention of Fred B.
Law.
V.

In Inte i:i ogatoi ;; 1 -1 : 6 1 latthe w s identified " 'i 111: e t: sc ns v* ii :) in ia]

have information concerning the Matthews Claim," including the names of twelve
specific individuals, but did not list Fred B. Law.
.. . .. W.

In response tu llir Pn ni i i \ iRajiiesL Inn Prniiiirlmii

I II i i iimrnl i

made to Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 34, the only document Matthews
produced was a copy of a one-page "Certificate of Licensure" issued by the Utah
iO

Division of Real Estate concerning the real estate license of David C. Matthews,
which Certificate clearly indicates that Matthews was licensed as an Associate
Broker of "Re-Max Brokers" from February 1998 to March 1999, and did not
become affiliated with "Re-Max Town & Country" until February 2001.
X.

The Certificate is consistent with Matthews' response to Request for

Admission No. 16 noted above, but is inconsistent with the false statements in his
affidavit discussed below.
Y.

In his response to Request for Admission No. 6, Matthews admitted

that at all relevant times he was "bound by the Utah statutes and administrative
rules applicable to licensed real estate associate brokers."
Z.

In response to Request No. 10, Matthews admitted that he

"personally asked Richard Jaffa to provide [to Matthews] a signed document
indicating that Olympus had agreed to pay [Matthews] a $100,000 real estate
commission in connection with Olympus 's purchase of the Property in December
1998, but he [Jaffa] refused to do so."
AA.

In the Receiver's initial memorandum filed July 6, 2005 in support

of her summary judgment motion, the Receiver argued that the Matthews Claim
was barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and also by Utah real
estate commission statutes.
BB.

In Matthew's Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of

perjury on June 7, 2004, in Matthew's Claim Response filed May 12,2005, and in
Matthew's sworn and binding answers to the Receiver's written discovery
11

requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the alleged oral promise to pay a
$100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and gave rise to a
payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him.
CC.

On August 12, 2005, when Matthews filed his memorandum in

opposition to summary judgment and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed
out that under Utah law only a principal broker could pursue a commission claim
against Olympus), Matthews stated under oath that the alleged oral promise
actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his
wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had assigned the
claim to him.
DD.

On October 20, 2005, when Matthews filed his "Supplemental

Memorandum" and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out the false
statements in the two prior affidavits), Matthews changed his story again by
asserting that it was not actually his wife who was the principal broker entitled to
assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the
claim to Matthews' wife, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews.
EE.

On August 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Memorandum in

Opposition to the Receiver's motion for summary judgment, and in support
thereof, he also filed the Affidavit of David C. Matthews (the "David Matthews
Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews (the "Jane Matthews
Affidavit").
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FF.

The David Matthews Affidavit contains false statements that directly

contradict Matthews5 prior representations and statements made under penalty of
perjury including in paragraph 4 of the affidavit wherein Matthews states that in
1998, he and his wife owed a real estate brokerage company in Park City named
"Re/Max Town and Country," and that his wife was the principal broker.
GG.

The Certificate of Licensure in Matthews5 own possession that he

produced in response to the Receiver's document request clearly shows that
Matthews did not become affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February
2001, more than two years after the December 1998 transaction.
HH.

The statement in paragraph 4 of the Matthews Affidavit directly

contradicts Matthews5 answer to Request for Admission No. 16.
II.

In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the David Matthews Affidavit, Matthews

states, that the alleged promise by Olympus to pay a $100,000 commission was
made directly "to Re/Max55 rather than to Matthews personally.
JJ.

Paragraph 12 of the David Matthews Affidavit states that Matthews5

pursuit of the $100,000 commission "has been in my capacity as the assignee from
my wife of the Commission,55 which statement directly contradicts the statements
Matthews made under penalty of perjury on the face of the Matthews Claim and
his other statements and representations alleging that the $100,000 commission
was promised to him personally and earned by him personally, and that he was
pursuing the claim in his own right and in his own name as the "Creditor55 to
whom Olympus owed the money.
13

KK.

The Jane Matthews Affidavit contains similar false statements

concerning Jane Matthews' alleged status as the principal broker of Re/Max Town
and Country in 1998.
LL.

The false statements in the David Matthews Affidavit and the Jane

Matthews Affidavit caused the Receiver to incur additional legal fees, including
but not limited to those incurred in investigating the new allegations, obtaining a
Certificate of Licensure concerning Jane Matthews, and pointing out those false
statements to this Court in the Receiver's reply memorandum in support of
summary judgment.
MM. Nearly two months after the Receiver's reply memorandum was
served, and only three business days before the summary judgment hearing,
Matthews served a second "Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews" admitting that her
prior affidavit contained false statements, admitting that "Re-Max Brokers, L.C."
(not Re/Max Town and Country) was the brokerage with which she and Matthews
were associated in 1998, and admitting that she was not a principal broker at the
relevant time.
NN.

Although the new affidavit of Jane Matthews contradicted and

purportedly corrected some of her prior sworn statements regarding these facts, no
new affidavit for David Matthews was submitted to withdraw or amend his own
false affidavit on these same points.
00.

The only affidavit of David Matthews on file with this Court

contains materially false statements that Matthews' knows are false.
14

PP.

In addition to purporting to correct prior false statements in her

affidavit, the new affidavit of Jane Matthews stated that an individual named Fred
B. Law was the principal broker with which both she and Matthews were affiliated
in 1998, and that Mr. Law had assigned the $100,000 commission claim to Jane
Matthews, who in turn assigned the claim to Matthews.
QQ.

Matthews filed the new affidavit of Jane Matthews on October 20,

2005 along with his "Supplemental Memorandum."
RR.

In the "Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews adopted his new

"Fred Law assignment" theory as the basis for his claim, and he also included an
affidavit of Fred B. Law.
SS.

In late October 2005, less than 3 business days before the summary

judgment hearing and more than 16 months after Matthews signed the Matthews
Claim under penalty of perjury, Matthews asserted for the first time that the
$100,000 claim he was pursuing against Olympus was actually a claim of Remax
Brokers, L.C., with Fred B. Law as principal broker that Matthews held only by
way of an indirect, double oral assignment.
TT.

The Receiver incurred additional fees responding to the untimely

and unauthorized Supplemental Memorandum and related supplemental affidavits.
UU.

At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing held October

24, 2005, this Court disallowed the Matthews Claim and ruled that the claim was
barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and applicable provisions of
Utah real estate commission statutes.
15

W.

The actions taken by Matthews in support of the Matthews Claim

were solely for the purpose of causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of
this litigation.
WW. Matthews' improper actions in pursuing the Matthews9 Claim were
motivated by his financial desire of $100,000, as sought by the Matthews' Claim.
R.3122.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly ruled that Matthews's claim for a real estate
commission in the amount of $100,000 based upon an alleged oral contract was barred by
the statute of frauds. In addition, the court also correctly found that Matthews was barred
from pursuing the claim for real estate commissions because he was not the real estate
broker involved in the particular real estate transaction.
Matthews argues that the district court was not entitled to consider the merits of
his claim because his claim must be "considered approved" pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 48-2c-1305(4). The district court properly ruled that section 48-2c-1305 is permissive
in nature. Therefore, the district court did not err in ruling that the Receiver was entitled
to seek a claim resolution procedure, and the court did not err in establishing that
procedure in this case.
Finally, the court did not err in awarding attorney fees to the Receiver in
connection with Matthews's meritless claim for the real estate commission.

16

ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
MATTHEWS'S CLAIM FOR A $100,000 REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
BASED UPON AN ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
Matthews claims that he is entitled to a real estate commission in the amount of

$100,000 based upon an oral modification of a written real estate agreement. The district
court did not err in holding that, as a matter of law, any claim based upon an oral contract
for a real estate commission is barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds.
Any oral agreement concerning the purchase or sale of real estate for
compensation is void and unenforceable under the plain language of the Utah Statute of
Frauds, which provides, in relevant part:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the
party to be charged with the agreement:

(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (emphasis added). Matthews boldly admits and professes that
his claim for a real estate commission of $100,000 is based on "an oral modification of
the brokerage agreement whereby an agent of Olympus promised to pay Mr. Matthews
and his brokerage an additional $100,000 commission." Brief of Appellant at 22
(emphasis added). Indeed, it was undisputed in the district court that the relevant written
documents stated that Matthews's brokerage, Re-Max, was to be paid (and was paid) a
total of $200 in "Sales/Broker's Commission." The very purpose of the statute of frauds
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is to prevent the dispute now before the Court and to "protect property owners from
fraudulent and fictitious claims for commissions." Machan Hampshire Props., Inc. v.
Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230,234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The statute of frauds "applies broadly" to all types of agreements concerning
compensation for brokering real estate transactions. Machan Hampshire, 779 P.2d at
234. As this Court explained:
Although application of the statute may lead to harsh results where a
real estate broker's labors go uncompensated, a broker must be
presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for rendition
of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is
invalid. A broker who fails to secure written authorization assumes
the risk of relying on oral promises and has no cause to complain if
efforts go unrewarded.
Id. at 234 n.8 (citations omitted; emphasis added). This Court in Machan Hampshire
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the landowner/defendant and against the broker
because there was no evidence of any written document signed by the landowner that
contained all of the essential terms of the alleged commission agreement. See id. at 23435; see also Wardley Corp. Better Homes and Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476, 477-78
(Utah App. 1991) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the landowner and against
the broker, citing Machan Hampshire with approval, and finding no basis for departing
"from the well-settled Utah case law on this subject"); O.I.C. Inc. v. Wilcox, 738 P.2d
630, 631 (Utah 1987) (affirming summary judgment for the landowner and against the
broker due to broker's failure to obtain landowner's signature on a listing agreement
specifying the agreed commission amount); Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640, 642-43 (Utah
1920) (reversing a judgment for the broker and remanding the case with directions to the
18

trial court to sustain the landowner's demurrer, and recognizing that "a real estate broker
or agent cannot recover commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a
purchaser for real property unless . . . there is an express contract or agreement of
authority in which the terms and conditions of his employment, if any, and the amount of
his commission, etc., are stated").
Matthews admittedly failed "to secure written authorization." He therefore
assumed "the risk of relying on oral promises and has no cause to complain if efforts go
unrewarded." Machan Hampshire, 779 P.2d at 234 n.8. Matthews did not submit to the
district court—and he does not identify for this Court—any written instrument stating
that Olympus would pay him a $100,000 commission. As noted by the district court, his
claim is wholly without merit.
Despite the clarity of the law on this matter, Matthews argues that an exception to
the statute of frauds applies because Olympus allegedly admitted that it owed him an
additional commission in the amount of $100,000. However, Matthews misstates the law
concerning judicial admissions, and his arguments are without merit.
Matthews relies upon the case of Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984), for
his argument that the statute of frauds does not apply when a party has admitted the
existence of an oral contract. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the principal
of a corporation was not excused by the statute of frauds from personal liability on a
guaranty he signed on behalf of his corporation, because he "admitted at trial that when
he signed the bill of sale on behalf of his corporation he intended and understood himself
to be a guarantor of the debt." Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d at 621 (emphasis added). The
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court based its holding on cases recognizing that the statute of frauds defense might be
waived by "admitting its existence in the pleadings" or by "admitting at trial the
existence and all essential terms of the contract." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
Bentley case makes clear that in order for the judicial admission exception to the statute
of frauds to apply, there must be an admission by the defendant either in pleadings or
under oath of all essential contract terms. Matthews did not allege in the district court,
and he does not allege now, that either Olympus or its Receiver has ever admitted in the
pleadings or under oath that Olympus agreed to pay him an additional commission of
$100,000.
For obvious reasons, if an admission is made in the course of a judicial
proceeding, a party should not be allowed to take a contrary position later on in the case.
In addition, there are certain indicia of reliability that are present in the context of a
judicial admission. For these reasons, courts recognize a narrow exception to the statute
of frauds in cases where there has been a judicial admission. In this case, however,
Matthews asserts that the alleged admission was made prior to the commencement of this
action. Further, the only evidence of the alleged admission in the district court was
Matthews's own affidavit, which was clearly self-serving. This is the exact type of
situation that the statute of frauds aims to prevent, and Matthews's argument that an
exception applies here is simply without merit. The district court therefore did not err in
ruling as a matter of law that Matthews did not have a valid claim against Olympus. This
Court should therefore affirm the decision of the district court.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT IN
ADDITION TO BEING BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
MATTHEWS'S CLAIM WAS ALSO BARRED BY UTAH'S REAL
ESTATE STATUTES.
In addition to ruling that Matthews's claim was barred by the statute of frauds, the

district court held that the claim was also barred by Utah's real estate statutes. If this
Court determines that the district court's ruling with respect to the statute of frauds was
correct, the Court does not need to consider the alternate basis for the district court's
ruling. However, even if this Court were to hold that the statute of frauds does not bar
Matthews's claim as a matter of law, the Court should affirm the decision of the district
court because Matthews's claim is also barred as a matter of law by Utah's real estate
broker licensing statutes.
Utah law specifically prohibits a real estate sales agent or associate broker from
"suing in his own name" or commencing "any action" for the recovery of a fee,
commission, or compensation concerning the purchase or sale of real estate, as follows:
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery
of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate
broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom [the seller
agent of associate broker] is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery of a
feey commission, or other compensation may only be instituted and brought by
the principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (emphasis added). It was undisputed in the district court
that Matthews was at all relevant times an "associate broker" (License No. 5452612ABOO) and not a "principal broker." In filing his claim, Matthews was trying to recover a
commission directly from a purchaser of real estate for his services as an associate
broker. Thus, his claim is illegal under Utah law.
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Matthews argues that the principal broker in this case (Fred Law) orally assigned
his claim to Matthews's wife (Jane Matthews) and that she then assigned the claim to
him. Even if these allegations were true, and even if there had been any evidence before
the district court of the alleged assignments, this Court should affirm nevertheless the
decision of the district court because Matthews's claim violates the plain language of the
relevant Utah statute.
The wording of the Utah statute is clear and unmistakable: "No sales agent or
associate broker may sue in his own name for recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation

" Utah Code § Ann. 61-2-18(2). Matthews filed the proof of claim in

this case in his own name, under penalty of perjury, for services he allegedly rendered,
with no indication that the alleged $100,000 commission was actually owed to his wife or
to Fred Law, the broker.
In addition, contrary to Matthews's assertion in his opening brief, Utah appellate
courts have addressed the broker commission statute at issue, Utah Code § 61-2-18, and
have held that its plain language applies literally to prohibit a person who is not a
licensed principal broker from suing a buyer or seller for a commission. For instance, in
Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), the Utah Supreme Court held that even
though a licensed real estate agent had an oral agreement with a licensed broker allowing
the agent to collect and retain all commissions derived from the agent's efforts (similar to
the alleged oral "assignment" on which Matthews relies in this case), the agent could not
sue the real estate seller directly to recover a promised commission. Young, 259 P.2d at
876-78. The case was governed by a predecessor statute, but the court explained that the
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then-recently enacted section 61-2-18 was "indicative of the legislative spirit and intent"
behind the prior statute. Id, at 878. In addressing section 61-2-18, the court determined
that it "prohibits any person or association from bringing an action for the recovery of
any commission" for brokerage services unless the person was duly licensed as a real
estate broker at the time the services were rendered. Id. The real estate agent even
admitted in open court that "he could look only to a licensed broker for his commission,"
and thus tried to join the broker as an involuntary plaintiff, but the court rejected the
attempt. Id, at 878-79.
In addition, in Morris v. John Price Assocs,, Inc., 590 P.2d 315 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court vacated a judgment in favor of a real estate agent for a commission
and held that the "trial court should have granted the motion for dismissal" as to the
agent's claim, because the language of section 61-2-18 was controlling. Morris, 590 P.2d
at 316. Conversely, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the agent's licensed
principal broker, and held that "[w]hat the rights may be as between plaintiff [the agent]
and his then employer [the principal broker] is something for them to adjust between
themselves." Id, at 317. Thus, if there were a valid claim for a $100,000 real estate
commission arising from Olympus's purchase of the subject property in December 1998,
only a licensed principal broker suing in its own name would have standing to sue
Olympus for the commission. Matthews's assertion that he holds an oral assignment
from his wife who received an oral assignment from the principal broker does nothing to
override the governing statutory language. See also Diversified Gen, Corp. v. White Barn
Golf Course, Inc., 584 P.2d 848, 848, 852 (Utah 1978) (affirming summary judgment for
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defendant based on section 61-2-18 because plaintiff was not a licensed principal broker
and thus could not sue for a commission for real estate services); Andalex Res., Inc. v.
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant based on section 61-2-18 against non-broker's claim for a real estate
commission and holding that statute is unambiguous and applies literally to bar any claim
against a buyer or seller for a commission by a person who does not have "the requisite
broker license").
Therefore, Matthews's argument that he is entitled to pursue collection of a
commission from Olympus in his own name because a principal broker allegedly orally
assigned rights to its commissions to Matthews's wife, who then allegedly orally
assigned the rights to Matthews, is contrary to the plain language of section 61-2-18 and
governing Utah case law holding that section 61-2-18 must be applied literally. The
district court did not err in holding that the claim was without merit.
m.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ESTABLISHING A CLAIMS
PROCEDURE IN THIS CASE NOR IN HOLDING THAT THE RECEIVER
WAS ENTITLED TO ADDRESS MATTHEWS'S CLAIM ON THE
MERITS.
In an effort to avoid a review of his claim on the merits, Matthews argued that—

despite the statute of frauds and the statutory prohibition against collection of
commissions by agents—his claim must be "considered approved" pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(4), a provision of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company
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Act (the "LLC Act").1 Specifically, in an attempt to prevent the Receiver and the district
court from addressing his claim on the merits, Matthews argued that the district court
lacked authority to establish any claims procedure that did not exactly mirror section 482c-1305(4). Matthews argues that his claim must therefore be deemed allowed.
However, as explained below, Matthews's argument ignores (1) the permissive nature of
the procedures set forth in sections 1305 and 1306 of the LLC Act, and (2) the district
court's broad authority to establish procedures for adjudicating claims of a company in
receivership under the supervision of the court.
The district court's authority to appoint a receiver was based on its "inherent
equitable power." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,fflj50-51. Moreover, "[a] receivership
is an equitable matter and is entirely within the control of the court." Interlake Co. v. Von
Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985). While, the Successor Receiver Order does refer to
certain provisions of the LLC Act, that act is permissive in nature and does not mandate
that a court adopt all of its procedures. In this case, the district court chose not to adopt
all of the procedures of the LLC act, and the court's order specifically provides: "Nothing
in this Order shall prevent the Receiver from requesting augmentation, modification, or

The statute does not define what it means when a claim is "considered approved." The
Receiver submits that an analogy to bankruptcy law is appropriate and that, at most,
"considered approved" should be construed to mean only that a rebuttal presumption
exists that the filed claim is "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the
claim." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). In the bankruptcy context a proof of claim is
"deemed allowed, unless a party in interest... objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). If an
objection is filed a claim that was otherwise "deemed allowed," then the bankruptcy
court determines the allowance of the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Thus, even if
Matthews's claim was "considered approved," it was still up to the court to determine
whether to actually allow the claim.
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supplementation of her powers as Receiver to the full extent permitted by law or equity
upon further application to the Court and after notice and hearing." R. 771 at \ 12
(emphasis added). Even under the LLC Act, "[t]he court appointing a receiver or
custodian has exclusive jurisdiction over the company and all of its property wherever
located," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1212(l), and the court "shall describe the powers and
duties of the receiver or custodian in its appointing order, which may be amended from
time to time," id. at § 1212(3). Further, after a decree of dissolution is entered for a
judicially dissolving company, the court is to direct "the winding up and liquidation of
the company's business and affairs in accordance with Part 13" of the LLC Act. Id. at §
1213(2) (emphasis added). Thus, a receivership court has broad discretion in overseeing
the receivership and dissolution of a limited liability company, and it may grant
appropriate powers to the receiver and establish appropriate procedures for the winding
up and liquidation of the company as long as they are "in accordance with" Part 13 of the
LLC Act.
The winding up and liquidation procedures of Part 13 of the LLC Act provide that
"there is no fixed time period for completion of winding up a dissolved company" except
that it should be completed "within a reasonable time under the circumstances," id.
§ 1301, and they give a dissolving company power to "settle or compromise . . . claims
brought against... the company," id. § 1302(3), and to "settle disputes by mediation,
arbitration, or court action" id. § 1302(8) (emphasis added). Sections 1305 and 1306 of
the LLC Act provide certain procedures that a dissolving company "/way" use in
disposing of claims, but by the plain language of the statute, those procedures are
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permissive, not mandatory. See id. §§ 1305(1), 1306(1). Consistent with and in
accordance with the LLC Act, the Successor Receiver Order provides permissively that
the Receiver "may accept or reject claims as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305
and 1306" but mandatorily directs that "[t]o the extent permitted by law, all claims filed
against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by this Court in and as part of this
proceeding." Id. at ^f 4 (emphasis added; cited and discussed in the Claim Procedures
Motion).
Thus, pursuant to its equitable powers, the district court specifically granted the
Receiver discretion to use or not use the provisions of sections 1305 and 1306 as she
deemed appropriate, with the mandatory proviso that all claims filed against Olympus be
"adjudicated and determined by this Court." Pursuant to her discretion under the
Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver elected to obtain the Bar Date Order to establish
a claims bar date and claims filing procedures that are consistent with sections 1305 and
1306, but she did not propose (and the district court did not mandate) any of the
procedures contained in sections 1305 and 1306 for resolving claims filed pursuant to the
Bar Date Order. In his opening brief, Matthews alleges that the Bar Date Order sets the
date "by which written notice of claims must be submitted pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 (2001)." Brief of Appellant at 7 (emphasis added).
However, contrary to Matthews's allegation, the Bar Date Order does not refer to section
48-2c-1305, much less state that claims must be filed pursuant to that statute. In fact,
because the Successor Receiver Order requires all filed claims to be "adjudicated and
determined by [the district court]" and the Bar Date Order addresses only the claim filing
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procedure, the Receiver had no authority to "accept or reject" claims without obtaining
further order(s) of the district court.
In addition, Matthews was properly and timely served with notice that the
Receiver intended to deal with claims against Olympus in two well-defined steps,
consistent with the district court's prior orders. First, the Receiver would obtain court
approval for a claims bar date and claims filing procedure. Second, only after she had
obtained a claims bar date and claims filing procedure and after she had the opportunity
to review and analyze the filed claims, would the Receiver obtain approval from the court
for specific procedures, tailored to the unique facts of this case, for resolving claims.
Matthews was well aware of the Receiver's two-step approach, yet he failed to assert any
timely objection. Only when the Receiver carried out the second of the two steps did
Matthews object to the two-step approach. The district court did not err in denying
Matthews's objection.
Matthews's motive in this case is facially transparent: he wants to have his
$100,000 claim accepted at face value and "paid immediately" from the assets of the
Receivership Estate without permitting any scrutiny of his claim by the Receiver, the
members and creditors of Olympus, the district court (which found that the claim was
meritless and filed in bad faith), and this Court. The district court did not err in ruling
that the Receiver was entitled to object to Matthews's claim and that the court was
entitled to determine it on the merits.
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IV,

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY
FEES TO THE RECEIVER
Finally, the district court did not err in ruling that the Receiver was entitled to

recover attorney fees in this case. First, the district court correctly ruled that the Receiver
was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. That statute
provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before
the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
In the context of section 78-27-56, "[w]here a party has acted on a meritless claim and in
bad faith, in most cases it would be inequitable not to award attorney fees." Wardley
Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 31 (emphasis added). The district
court judge in this case, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, carefully considered the facts
and the law in rendering his opinion, and he properly ruled that the Receiver was entitled
to recover all of her reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending against Matthews 5s
claim against Olympus because the claim was both without merit and pursued in bad
faith.

29

A.

Without Merit

A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, If 22. The
district court did not err in finding that the Matthews Claim was of "little weight" with
"no basis in law or fact."
Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute of frauds by
arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting citations to the
contrary, that the commission amount was not an essential contract term and need not be
in writing. He also argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a limited
exception under Utah case law that applies only in the narrow circumstance in which a
defendant has admitted, either injudicial pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract
exists. Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted the
existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn statement.
Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was made in late 1998 to
obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of Olympus as evidence of
the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. Indeed, Matthews even admits that his
attempt to obtain a signed writing from Richard Jaffa to evidence the alleged oral
promise was unsuccessful.
In addition, after the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission
statutes, Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by arguing,

The Receiver does not admit that Richard Jaffa was an authorized representative of
Olympus, but even if he was, Matthews never obtained any written evidence (sworn or
unsworn) from Richard Jaffa.
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contrary to his original position, that he was an oral assignee of an oral assignee of a
claim belonging to a principal broker and that he could pursue the assignor's claim in his
own name. However, even under his revised position, governing Utah case law (as set
forth above) strictly interprets the relevant statutory language and specifically prohibits
any real estate agent or associate broker (as was Matthews) from pursuing a commission
claim against anyone other than the principal broker, even if the agent or associate broker
claims to hold an assignment from the principal broker. Matthews cited no Utah case law
to the contrary (and incorrectly asserted that there was no applicable Utah case law).
There is no Utah case law that would excuse his failure to comply with the governing
statutory provision. Thus, Matthews's arguments were "without merit" for purposes of
section 78-27-56 as well.
The Utah Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold trial courts in ruling that
claims with similarly weak or non-existent legal support were "without merit" and has
permitted an award of legal fees under section 78-27-56. See Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99,130; Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 22;
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (holding that "a finding that a
party has attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely will support a decision to award
attorney fees if combined with a finding of bad faith").
B.

In Bad Faith

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in order to find that a party acted in "bad
faith" for purposes of section 78-27-56,
the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (i) the
party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the
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party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would
hinder, delay, or defraud others.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). Matthews's lack of an honest
belief in the legal basis for his claim, and his knowledge that his pursuit of the claim
would unjustly hinder and delay the Receiver in her attempts to administer and close the
Olympus receivership estate, is evidenced by his contradictory representations and
admissions in the trial court.
In his Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of perjury on June 7, 2004,
in his Claim Response filed May 12,2005, and in his binding answers to the Receiver's
written discovery requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the alleged oral promise
to pay a $100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and gave rise to a
payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him. Then, on August 12, 2005, when he
filed his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment and related affidavits (after
the Receiver pointed out that under Utah law only a principal broker could pursue a
commission claim against Olympus), Matthews stated under oath that the alleged oral
promise actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his
wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had assigned the claim to
him. Then, on October 20, 2005, when he filed his "Supplemental Memorandum" and
related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out false statements in the two prior
affidavits), Matthews changed his story a third time by asserting that it was not actually
his wife who was the principal broker entitled to assert the claim against Olympus, but

32

Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the claim to Matthews's wife, who later orally
assigned the claim to Matthews.
Whether the false statements were made in Matthews's sworn statements and
admissions that the alleged $100,000 commission was promised to him and owed to him
in his own right for his own efforts, or in Matthews's later sworn statements that the
alleged $100,000 commission was promised and owed to Re-Max Town & Country with
his wife as principal broker, or in Matthews' latest representations in the last-minute
"Supplemental Memorandum" that the alleged $100,000 commission was promised and
owed to Fred B. Law and then indirectly assigned to him, it is clear that Matthews has
made materially false and patently inconsistent statements in this proceeding, and that he
knew (or was charged with knowing) that his statements were false when he made them.
In fact, Matthews's own discovery responses, along with the second affidavit of his wife,
Jane Matthews, conclusively establish that Matthews knew his own affidavit filed with
the district court contained false statements.
Moreover, Matthews knew (or was charged with knowing) that his claim was
barred by the statute of frauds and the Utah broker commission statutes. Matthews
admitted that he was a licensed associate broker at all relevant times and was bound to
follow the governing statutes and regulations. He submitted more that 100 pages of
documents to the Receiver as support for his claim, but he knew that nothing in any of
those documents specified a $100,000 commission or an assignment thereof. As a
licensed real estate professional, he was charged with knowledge that an alleged oral
promise of a commission is unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of frauds.
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"[A] broker must be presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for rendition
of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan
Hampshire Props., Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah
App. 1989). As a Utah-licensed real estate professional, Matthews also should be
charged with knowledge that under the plain language of governing Utah broker
commission statutes, he was strictly prohibited from pursuing a claim in his own name
against Olympus for a real estate commission.
In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 23, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that the trial court had found "bad faith" under section 78-27-56 because the claims the
plaintiff was asserting "had been sold by the bankruptcy trustee to Defendants in
compliance with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court." The supreme court
ruled that the bad faith finding was not clearly erroneous because the fact that "plaintiff
knew of the sale and participated without objection in it, was certainly sufficient to raise
the inference of bad faith on plaintiffs part." Similarly, in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the trial court found that the plaintiffs pursued their claims
with "no other apparent reason than to harass .. . and/or to drive up the costs of
litigation," and the supreme court held that the finding was enough to satisfy the "bad
faith" element of section 78-27-56. Those cases support a finding in this case that the
Matthews Claim was not asserted or pursued in good faith, because Matthews' presumed
knowledge of Utah law respecting commission agreements and commission collections,
and his materially false and contradictory sworn statements, are "certainly sufficient to
raise the inference of bad faith," and because Matthews has pursued his claim for "no
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other apparent reason" than to "drive up the costs of litigation" in trying to recover a
claim he knew he was not entitled to pursue.
In addition to the foregoing, the district court properly ruled that the Receiver was
entitled to attorney fees on the alternate ground that Matthews submitted affidavits in bad
faith or solely for purposes of delay in violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g).
Thus, even if the Receiver were not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to section
78-27-56, she was entitled to recover those fees incurred as a result of the affidavits
Matthews filed on August 12, 2005, and October 20, 2005, in opposition to the
Receiver's summary judgment motion. As noted above, it is undisputed that the August
12 affidavits contained false statements, and the October 20 affidavit contains statements
that contradict Matthews' prior statements and representations, including those made in
his Notice of Claim, his answers to discovery requests, and his Claim Response. Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs summary judgment proceedings,
provides in relevant part:
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g). Because the two grounds for attorney fees under this rule are
stated in the disjunctive, a showing of bad faith is not required if it is evident that the
affidavits were presented "solely for the purpose of delay." In this case, both bad faith
and an intent to delay are evident and were found present by Judge Medley.
Along with the summary judgment motion filed July 6, 2005, the Receiver
submitted an affidavit with a certified record from the Utah Division of Real Estate
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establishing conclusively that Matthews was not a "principal broker" and therefore was
not entitled to pursue a commission claim against Olympus. In response, Matthews filed
the August 12 affidavits claiming that his wife, Jane Matthews, was the principal broker.
In reply, the Receiver submitted a further affidavit with a certified record from the Utah
Division of Real Estate establishing conclusively that Jane Matthews was not "principal
broker" at the relevant time. Then, in connection with his unauthorized "Supplemental
Memorandum," Matthews filed two more affidavits on October 20 purporting to
establish, for the first time (and ignoring all of his prior statements to the contrary) that
the oral promise for a $100,000 commission was actually a claim that initially belonged
to principal broker Fred B. Law, who orally assigned it to Jane Matthews, who then
orally assigned it to Matthews. This chain of events, if it does not establish bad faith,
certainly establishes that Matthews presented the affidavits solely for the purpose of
delay and to unjustly increase the costs of litigation.
Although it appears there are no reported Utah cases discussing the relevant
language of Utah Rule Civ. P. 56(g), the language of the comparable federal rule is nearly
identical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Under the federal rule, numerous courts have held
that rule 56(g) sanctions are appropriate against a party submitting affidavits on summary
judgment that contain false statements or material omissions. E.g., In re Gioioso, 979
F.2d 956, 961-62 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing lower court's refusal to award attorney fees
and holding that because affidavits "flatly contradicted earlier sworn depositions" and
"failed to raise material issues of fact," rule 56(g) "required" that fees be awarded);
Modica v. United States, 518 F.2d 374, 376-77 and n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) (approving
36

sanctions imposed by the trial court, apparently under rule 56(g), against a party who
submitted an affidavit that was an "eleventh-hour denial of facts admitted over a threeyear period"); Warshay v. Guinness PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(imposing rule 56(g) sanctions in action for breach of oral agreement, in part because
plaintiff omitted material facts in his affidavit), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991); SMS
Assocs. V. Clay, 868 F. Supp. 337, 344 (D.D.C. 1994) (awarding attorney fees under Rule
56(g) against litigant for his "dilatory tactics," "affidavits made in bad faith," and "untrue
representations under oath"), aff'd, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Barticheck v. Fidelity
Union Bank, 680 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D.N.J. 1998) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions because
plaintiff filed affidavit contradicting her prior deposition testimony); Cobell v. Norton,
214 F.R.D. 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions on defendants who filed
"an affidavit containing material representations of fact that defendants knew to be false"
because they "possessed a letter" showing contrary facts).
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to
award attorney fees to the Receiver in this case. In addition, pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33, the Court should award the Receiver her attorney fees on appeal
<2

Matthews asserts that the district court erred in awarding the Receiver fees for
approximately seventeen hours of time that Annette Jarvis spent in representing
Olympus as a partner at the Receiver's law firm, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. He also
alleges that the court erred in awarding fees for approximately five hours of time spent
by Steven Strong in filing an administrative complaint and in awarding fees for
approximately six hours of time in responding to Matthews's objections to the summary
judgment order proposed by the Receiver. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in any of these matters. First Matthews never explains why Ms. Jarvis could not act in a
dual capacity, as both Receiver and counsel. Second, the district court, which was
familiar with the facts of the case, did not abuse its discretion in finding that the work
performed by the Receiver's counsel was necessary and that the amount of time spent
was appropriate.
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on the basis that if the arguments below were without merit, the appeal is also necessarily
without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court
in this matter.
DATED this T

day of April, 2007.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Steven T. Waterman
Steven C. Strong
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for the Receiver
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